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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
At this moment, more than 30 companies across 
the globe say they are working on autonomous-
vehicle technology. These companies range from 
computing-technology firms like Apple, Google, and 
Intel to those usually associated with automobile 
manufacturing1 such as BMW, Ford, Honda, and 
Volvo.2 Their most optimistic predictions are that 
in as few as three to five years,3 fully autonomous 
vehicles—automobiles without human drivers—will be 
in regular use on the road..
Predictions vary about whether fully autonomous 
vehicles, Level 5 on the SAE International 
classification scale for autonomous-vehicle 
technology4, will be introduced first. Yet, given 
the number of companies working to make 
improvements and the progress already made with 
Level 4 technology—which marks the stage when 
vehicles are classified as being capable of safely 
driving themselves in predictable spaces—it is highly 
possible that the technology will progress to Level 
5 in the near future. Many economists, pundits, and 
companies are predicting just that.
Autonomous-vehicle technology offers a number 
of positive opportunities. It has the potential to 
save many lives, limit environmental damage, 
increase productivity and, as a result, improve 
living standards across the country if the gains are 
distributed equally.5 But the technology also has the 
potential to cause significant economic hardship for 
a number of workers, at least in the short term. For 
those who drive vehicles for a living, the full financial 
impact of this technological change will depend, in 
large part, on whether the transition takes a while or 
occurs relatively quickly. It will also depend heavily 
on whether the initial technology deployed is fully or 
partially autonomous.
Overall, 2.86 percent of all workers in the United 
States are employed in driving occupations. Though 
it is possible that workers displaced by autonomous-
vehicle technology may eventually find new jobs 
at some point, the analysis contained in this paper 
is focused on the immediate, short-term impact to 
employment in the transportation sector if a rapid 
transition to fully autonomous vehicles were to occur. 
Using data from the 2010 to 2014 merged American 
Community Survey released by the U.S. Census 
Bureau, this paper estimates the labor market impact 
of jobs likely to be lost with a rapid transition to 
autonomous vehicles. The report finds that certain 
population groups and areas of the country would 
be disproportionately affected. Finally, we call for 
policymakers to take immediate steps to offset the 
potential for harmful labor disruptions.
The following is a summary of the study’s top 
findings:
OCCUPATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
More than four million jobs will likely be lost with a 
rapid transition to autonomous vehicles.
Driving occupations, including delivery and heavy 
truck drivers, bus drivers, and taxi and chauffeur 
drivers, would be heaviest hit.
Driving occupations represent a significant source 
of work for those with lower levels of educational 
attainment, with the vast majority (93.2 percent) 
of workers in these jobs possessing less than a 
bachelor’s degree.
Workers in driving occupations have a poverty rate 
(7.32 percent) lower than the overall workforce (8.06 
percent) and non-driving occupations alone (8.08 
percent), which suggests that driving jobs are by 
and large “good jobs” that keep workers in driving 
occupations out of poverty.
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Larger shares of workers in driving occupations (15.68 
percent) are union members, compared with workers 
in non-driving occupations (11.31 percent). In total, 
only 11.44 of workers overall are union members.
This suggests that driving jobs, on average, may 
have more advantages for workers than similar 
occupations with lower union membership rates.
DEMOGRAPHIC CONSIDERATIONS
Men would be hardest hit. They number about 6.5 
times the share of the working female population in 
driving occupations and earn 64 percent more than 
women in these jobs.
Although nearly as many women as men are bus 
drivers, men are the vast majority of those employed 
as delivery and heavy truck drivers and as taxi drivers 
and chauffeurs.
Whites hold 62 percent of the 4.1 million jobs in driving 
occupations, so they would experience the largest hit.
However, Blacks, Hispanics, and Native Americans, 
groups who are overrepresented in these 
occupations and who earn a “driving premium”—a 
median annual wage exceeding what they would 
receive in non-driving occupations—would also be 
hard hit.
 With 4.23 percent of Black workers employed in 
driving occupations compared to 2.85 percent 
of all workers in these jobs, Blacks rely on driving 
jobs more than other racial/ethnic groups. This is 
true in every driving occupation category.
 With 3.25 percent of Hispanic workers in driving 
occupations, Hispanics have the second heaviest 
reliance and are especially overrepresented as 
delivery drivers and heavy truck drivers and very 
slightly as taxi drivers and chauffeurs.
 With 3.07 percent of American Indians holding 
driving jobs, American Indians are also slightly 
overrepresented, especially among delivery 
drivers and heavy truck drivers and as bus drivers 
and, modestly, as taxi drivers and chauffeurs.
 With 1.52 percent of Asian workers holding 
driving jobs, Asians rely the least on driving 
occupations for employment. Nevertheless they 
are overrepresented among taxi drivers and 
chauffeurs: Overall, 0.23 percent of workers are 
taxi drivers and chauffeurs, but 0.56 percent of 
Asians are, more than twice the overall share.
 Workers of “Other” racial and ethnic categories are 
overrepresented among taxi drivers and chauffeurs.
Another significant finding regarding wages is that 
some driving occupations pay non-whites more 
than whites. For bus drivers and taxi drivers and 
chauffeurs, non-whites make more than their white 
counterparts when looking at median annual wages 
either by race or by race and gender together.
White men are by far the highest number of workers 
in driving occupations, followed by Hispanic men, 
Black men, and White women.
GEOGRAPHIC CONSIDERATIONS
Because the share and number of workers in 
driving occupations vary by state, some geographic 
locations will be disproportionately burdened by the 
loss of driving jobs.
 The top five states with the greatest percentage 
of workers in driving jobs in rank order are 
Mississippi (3.70 percent), Wyoming (3.64 
percent), West Virginia (3.60), Idaho (3.45 
percent), and North Dakota (3.44 percent).
 The top five states with the largest absolute 
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number of workers in driving occupations, 
however, are California (432,000), Texas 
(353,000), New York (282,000), Florida (224,000), 
and Illinois (189,000).
Nevertheless, the states that would be hardest hit 
by a rapid shift to autonomous vehicles are the 
states where workers are overrepresented in driving 
occupations and where driving occupations pay 
significantly more than non-driving occupations.
 By this standard, the states that are most 
vulnerable are North Dakota, Idaho, Wyoming, 
West Virginia, Mississippi, Arkansas, and Iowa.
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
In light of the labor market disruptions that are likely 
to accompany a swift transition to fully autonomous 
vehicles, policymakers should prioritize solutions 
that best offset the negative effects of abrupt 
and widespread job losses. Policies that meet this 
criterion include:
Automatic Unemployment Insurance (UI)
UI and related re-employment assistance 
benefits should kick in automatically for eligible 
workers, particularly those in areas of the 
country likely to be hardest hit by job losses from 
autonomous vehicles. The duration of coverage 
for these benefits should also be automatically 
extended during periods of high unemployment. 
UI and related job training and placement 
benefits should be fully funded and modernized 
to meet the anticipated demand.
Progressive Basic Income
Since the efficiency of today’s technological 
advancements may outpace our ability to replace 
automated jobs with new jobs for the displaced, it 
would be prudent to establish a progressive basic 
income (PBI) to offset the likely potential for seismic 
changes in the labor market. The Social Security 
program—which has features that facilitate the 
collection and distribution of revenue on a broad 
scale—is the most effective and efficient delivery 
mechanism by which this could be accomplished. 
The Progressive Basic Income would not replace 
Social Security’s retiree, disability, and survivor 
programs, but would be part of an expanded 
Social Security system.  
Education and Retraining
Since the vast majority of workers in driving 
occupations have lower educational attainment 
levels, education and retraining could help 
displaced workers secure comparable or 
better jobs. Although higher education does 
not necessarily translate into jobs or economic 
mobility, policies that promote affordable 
postsecondary education and training options—
with built-in subsidies for displaced workers—as 
well as fully funding existing programs such as 
American Job Centers, are important options.
Automatic Medicaid Eligibility
Federal and state governments should expand 
Medicaid eligibility to automatically cover 
displaced workers with household incomes below 
a determined level. This type of assistance will 
enable workers to protect their health and their 
wallets while they seek opportunities to retrain, 
get additional education, and/or find a new job.
Expanding Support for Entrepreneurs
Programs and incentives that can help displaced 
workers start and sustain businesses could lead 
to job creation and have a generative effect on 
the U.S. economy.
6
STICK SHIFT
www.globalpolicysolutions.org 
INTRODUCTION
“This job [as a bus driver] provides meaningful satisfying work, with a salary and benefits package which 
allows me to take care of myself and my family . . . . Without this job I would more than likely have to take 
on multiple jobs in order to provide the lifestyle I currently enjoy, which would mean less quality time with 
loved ones, more stress, frustration, and very likely less life satisfaction.”
KEVIN, a bus driver for the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority6
I n October 2016, a computer system drove a truck most of the distance between Fort Collins and Colorado Springs, Colorado, to deliver 50,000 beers. This trip was a test of Uber’s 
self-driving, or autonomous-vehicle, technology. A 
driver was needed to deal with the non-highway 
driving, but the ultimate goal is to eliminate the 
human driver altogether.7 This autonomous-vehicle 
technology could eliminate four million driving jobs 
in the near future.
At this moment, more than 30 companies across 
the globe say they are working on autonomous-
vehicle technology. These companies range from 
computing-technology firms like Apple, Google, and 
Intel to those usually associated with automobile 
manufacturing8 like BMW, Ford, Honda, and Volvo.9 
Their most optimistic predictions are that in as few 
as three to five years,10 fully autonomous vehicles—
vehicles without human drivers—will be on the road 
in regular use.
WIDESPREAD ADOPTION OF AUTONOMOUS-VEHICLE TECHNOLOGY  
COULD THREATEN MORE THAN FOUR MILLION JOBS
PEOPLE OF COLOR AND RESIDENTS OF NORTH DAKOTA, IDAHO, WYOMING, WEST 
VIRGINIA, MISSISSIPPI, ARKANSAS, IOWA, AND INDIANA AMONG MOST AT RISK
STICK SHIFT
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For workers, the impact of 
this technological change will 
depend in part on whether 
the transition takes a while or 
occurs relatively quickly. Rapid 
technological change could 
produce significant economic 
disruptions for certain groups 
in the U.S. economy. People of 
color nationally and workers in 
North Dakota, Idaho, Wyoming, 
West Virginia, Mississippi, 
Arkansas, Iowa, and Indiana 
would be hurt the most by a 
rapid transition. These groups 
are overrepresented in driving 
occupations and those who work in driving 
occupations tend to make more than those in non-
driving occupations. This suggests that many in 
these groups may be directly affected by the rise of 
autonomous vehicles—by losing their jobs or from 
declining wages in driving occupations—and also 
from lower wages in non-driving occupations.
Autonomous-vehicle technology has the potential 
to save many lives, limit environmental damage, 
and increase productivity—and therefore, improve 
living standards across the country, if the gains are 
distributed equally11—but it also has the potential 
to cause significant economic hardship, at least in 
the short term. To avoid this, a safety net that can 
support workers in the event of large-scale, rapid 
job loss and policies that can transition workers 
to new jobs are essential. The unemployment 
insurance system also should be changed so more 
unemployed workers can use it, and so it better 
helps laid-off workers find new jobs. Job transition 
can be made easier with more resources for the 
education and training of workers displaced by 
autonomous vehicles as well as other potential 
new technologies that cause large changes in the 
labor market.
Monetary and fiscal policy measures that aim for 
full employment can ensure that there are jobs 
available at livable wages for workers displaced by 
technological changes. These changes cannot be 
stopped, and it would not be desirable to stop them 
even if it were possible to do so. But policies should 
be put in place to prevent technological change 
from destroying livelihoods and to assure that the 
gains from technological innovation are shared as 
broadly as possible. This is especially the case when 
technology adversely affects large groups of people 
via no fault of their own.
Section 1 of this paper analyzes which groups would 
be most affected if the transition to autonomous 
vehicles occurs rapidly; that is, if technology is 
developed that can perform most of the tasks of 
driving occupations so those occupations could 
be eliminated. Section 2 reviews the policies that 
could respond to large-scale disruptions, primarily 
of driving occupations, in the labor market. Section 
3 examines the diverse set of predictions for the 
arrival of fully, or near-fully, autonomous vehicles, 
and its impact on the labor market. Finally, the paper 
concludes with a call for acting soon to prevent labor 
market disruptions, even though it is impossible to 
know the specific effects of this technology.
Percent of Workers in Driving Occupations 
by Occupation, 2010–2014
Source: Authors’ analysis of American Community Survey data from IPUMS-USA, University of Minnesota, www.ipums.org.
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SECTION 1:  
DRIVING 
OCCUPATIONS: 
THE LABOR 
MARKET MOST 
LIKELY IMPACTED 
BY WIDESPREAD 
ADOPTION OF 
AUTONOMOUS-
VEHICLE 
TECHNOLOGY
Workers displaced by 
autonomous-vehicle technology 
may eventually find new jobs or 
they may not, but the analysis 
here is focused on the possible 
short-term impact of a rapid 
transition to autonomous vehicles. 
This analysis is based on the 
2010–2014 merged American 
Community Survey data from 
the U.S. Census Bureau.12 Table 
1 and figure A provide a basic 
breakdown of driving occupations 
in three categories: bus drivers, 
delivery drivers and heavy truck 
drivers, and taxi drivers and 
chauffeurs. Numbering more 
than 3.1 million, delivery drivers 
and heavy truck drivers dominate 
driving occupations, with over 77 
percent of the total. Next, almost 
600,000 bus drivers account for 
about 14.5 percent; almost 340,000 people work as 
taxi drivers and chauffeurs, making up 8.2 percent 
of the total. It is important to note that while these 
categories are useful ways of grouping occupations for 
comparison purposes, there are important differences 
within these categories.13 These differences might be 
important in determining the speed of the transition to 
autonomous-vehicle technology and the extent of its 
impact for specific occupations.
Table 2 and figures B and C show the median annual 
wages for driving and non-driving occupations. 
Delivery drivers and heavy truck drivers have the 
highest median pay, about $34,700. Bus drivers follow, 
with pay of about $21,700; finally taxi drivers and 
chauffeurs make about $20,700. It is significant that 
Number and Percent of Workers 
in Driving Occupations by 
Occupation, 2010–2014 Number  (average across five years) Percent
BUS DRIVERS 596,213 14.47%
DELIVERY DRIVERS AND HEAVY TRUCK DRIVERS 3,187,046 77.32%
TAXI DRIVERS AND CHAUFFEURS 338,366 8.21%
ALL OCCUPATIONS 4,121,625
Source: Authors’ analysis of American Community Survey data from IPUMS-USA, University of Minnesota, www.ipums.org.
TABLE 1. 
Median Annual Wages for 
Driving and Non-Driving 
Occupations, 2010–2014
Median Wage
BUS DRIVERS $21,685
DELIVERY DRIVERS AND HEAVY TRUCK DRIVERS $34,738
TAXI DRIVERS AND CHAUFFEURS $20,737
ALL OCCUPATIONS $33,685
Median Wage
NON-DRIVING OCCUPATIONS $33,685
DRIVING OCCUPATIONS $30,934
DIFFERENCE (NON-DRIVING MINUS DRIVING) $2,751
Source: Authors’ analysis of American Community Survey data from IPUMS-USA, University of Minnesota, www.ipums.org.
TABLE 2. 
Real 2014$ wages
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delivery drivers and heavy truck 
drivers are paid the most because 
they also have the greatest number 
of drivers, as shown in table 1, 
with over 77 percent of the total. 
Non-driving occupations have a 
premium on driving occupations, 
in total, with those occupations 
earning roughly $2,800 more than 
driving occupations; thus, drivers 
on the whole are paid less than 
their non-driving counterparts.14
GENDER
Driving occupations are 
dominated by men. There 
are 3.6 million men in these 
occupations, but only about half 
a million women (table 3 shows 
the number and percent of men 
and women employed in driving 
occupations). The share of the 
working male population in these 
occupations is about 6.5 times 
the share of the working female 
population. Thus, if there were a 
rapid transition to autonomous 
vehicles, it would have the 
most significant impact—at least 
in the short term—on men’s 
employment.
Since the 1960s, there has been a decline in the 
share of prime-age (ages 25 to 54) men who are 
employed.15 These declines are likely due, in part, to 
the decline in “good jobs” for men.16 (See discussion 
of “good jobs” in the Conclusion. The loss of driving 
jobs could exacerbate this situation.)
By occupation, the greatest difference in the 
employment of men and women in driving 
occupations is among delivery drivers and heavy 
truck drivers. Nearly 4 percent of men are employed 
in this category, while only about a quarter of one 
percent of women are (a staggering rate of over 15 
to one). Men’s rate of employment as taxi drivers 
and chauffeurs is also nearly six times that of 
women (0.39 percent for men versus 0.07 percent 
for women). However, men and women have nearly 
equal rates of employment (0.43 percent for men 
versus 0.40 percent for women) as bus drivers. 
Overall, 4.79 percent of men and 0.73 percent of 
Median Annual Wages for Driving Occupations, 
2010–2014
Source: Authors’ analysis of American Community Survey data from IPUMS-USA, University of Minnesota, www.ipums.org.
FIGURE B. 
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women are employed in driving 
occupations. Although men 
would likely be hardest hit by a 
transition to autonomous-vehicle 
technology, a significant number 
of women work as drivers, 
especially bus drivers.
It is typical for men to earn 
more than women employed 
in the same occupations, and 
this is also the case in driving 
occupations.17 Men in driving 
occupations have a median 
annual wage of nearly $33,000, 
64 percent more than similarly 
employed women, who have a 
median wage of about $20,000 
(table 4 and figure D). This 
comparison, however, does not 
take into account differences 
between men and women in 
their distribution within the 
driving occupations.18
For men and women generally, 
non-driving occupations have 
a higher median annual wage 
than driving occupations. For 
men, non-driving occupations 
pay about $8,000 more than 
driving occupations. For women, 
non-driving occupations pay 
about $9,000 more than driving 
occupations.
RACE AND HISPANIC 
ETHNICITY19
Although Whites make up about 
62 percent of the 4.1 million 
workers in driving occupations 
Number and Percent of Workers in Driving 
Occupations by Occupation and Gender, 2010–2014
Source: Authors’ analysis of American Community Survey data from IPUMS-USA, University of Minnesota, www.ipums.org.
TABLE 3. 
Male Female Total
BUS DRIVERS 324,634 271,578 596,213
DELIVERY DRIVERS AND HEAVY TRUCK DRIVERS 3,011,068 175,977 3,187,046
TAXI DRIVERS AND CHAUFFEURS 293,335 45,031 338,366
ALL OCCUPATIONS 3,629,038 492,587 4,121,625
Average across five years
Male Female Total
BUS DRIVERS 0.43 0.40 0.41
DELIVERY DRIVERS AND HEAVY TRUCK DRIVERS 3.97 0.26 2.21
TAXI DRIVERS AND CHAUFFEURS 0.39 0.07 0.23
ALL OCCUPATIONS 4.79 0.73 2.85
Percent of all workers  
within each gender category
Male Female
BUS DRIVERS 54.45 45.55
DELIVERY DRIVERS AND HEAVY TRUCK DRIVERS 94.48 5.52
TAXI DRIVERS AND CHAUFFEURS 86.69 13.31
ALL OCCUPATIONS 52.58 47.42
Percent of each gender within 
each occupation category
Median Annual Wages for Driving and  
Non-Driving Occupations by Gender, 2010–2014
Source: Authors’ analysis of American Community Survey data from IPUMS-USA, University of Minnesota, www.ipums.org.
FIGURE D. 
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(table 5), proportionally they 
are slightly underrepresented in 
these occupations. 2.85 percent 
of all workers are in driving 
occupations, but 2.66 percent of 
white workers are (table 5 and 
figure E). Blacks, Hispanics, and 
American Indians, on the other 
hand, are overrepresented in 
these occupations. Blacks rely 
on driving jobs more than other 
racial/ethnic groups, with 4.23 
percent of black workers employed 
Median Annual Wages for Driving 
and Non-Driving Occupations 
 by Gender, 2010–2014 Male Female
NON-DRIVING OCCUPATIONS $40,400 $28,872
DRIVING OCCUPATIONS $32,633 $19,895
DIFFERENCE  (NON-DRIVING MINUS DRIVING) $7,767 $8,976
Source: Authors’ analysis of American Community Survey data from IPUMS-USA, University of Minnesota, www.ipums.org.
TABLE 4. 
Real 2014$ wages
Number and Share of Workers in Driving Occupations 
by Occupation, Race and Hispanic Ethnicity, 2010–2014
Source: Authors’ analysis of American Community Survey data from IPUMS-USA, University of Minnesota, www.ipums.org.
TABLE 5. 
White Hispanic Black Asian American Indian Other Total
BUS DRIVERS 342,608 71,340 155,834 11,097 9,186 6,148 596,213
DELIVERY DRIVERS AND HEAVY TRUCK DRIVERS 2,048,530 587,888 415,129 61,215 44,970 29,314 3,187,046
TAXI DRIVERS AND CHAUFFEURS 145,985 57,367 81,671 42,490 4,736 6,117 338,366
ALL OCCUPATIONS 2,537,122 716,595 652,634 114,802 58,892 41,579 4,121,625
White Hispanic Black Asian American Indian Other Total
BUS DRIVERS 0.36 0.32 1.01 0.15 0.48 0.33 0.41
DELIVERY DRIVERS AND HEAVY TRUCK DRIVERS 2.15 2.67 2.69 0.81 2.34 1.57 2.21
TAXI DRIVERS AND CHAUFFEURS 0.15 0.26 0.53 0.56 0.25 0.33 0.23
ALL OCCUPATIONS 2.66 3.25 4.23 1.52 3.07 2.23 2.85
White Hispanic Black Asian American Indian Other
BUS DRIVERS 57.46 11.97 26.14 1.86 1.54 1.03
DELIVERY DRIVERS AND HEAVY TRUCK DRIVERS 64.28 18.45 13.03 1.92 1.41 0.92
TAXI DRIVERS AND CHAUFFEURS 43.14 16.95 24.14 12.56 1.40 1.81
ALL OCCUPATIONS 61.56 17.39 15.83 2.79 1.43 1.01
Average across five years
Percent of all workers within 
each racial/ethnic category
Percent of each race/ethnicity 
within each occupation category
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in driving occupations; they are 
overrepresented in each specific 
driving category as well. Among 
Hispanic workers, 3.25 percent 
are in these occupations, and they 
are overrepresented as delivery 
drivers and heavy truck drivers 
and very slightly as taxi drivers and 
chauffeurs. American Indians are 
also slightly overrepresented; 3.07 
percent hold driving jobs. They are 
overrepresented in the delivery 
drivers and heavy truck drivers 
category an, modestly, as bus drivers 
and taxi drivers and chauffeurs.
Asians rely the least on driving 
occupations for employment. 
Only 1.52 percent of Asian 
workers hold these jobs. 
However, looking at specific 
occupational categories, Asians 
are overrepresented among taxi 
drivers and chauffeurs: Overall, 
0.23 percent of workers are taxi 
drivers and chauffeurs, but 0.56 
percent of Asians have these 
jobs, more than twice the overall 
Median Annual Wages for Driving  
and Non-Driving Occupations by Race 
and Hispanic Ethnicity, 2010–2014
Source: Authors’ analysis of American Community Survey data from IPUMS-USA, University of Minnesota, www.ipums.org.
TABLE 6. 
White Hispanic Black Asian American Indian Other
NON-DRIVING OCCUPATIONS $38,005 $24,211 $28,449 $40,655 $26,809 $30,000
DRIVING OCCUPATIONS $31,580 $30,084 $30,934 $26,019 $28,800 $27,841
DIFFERENCE  (NON-DRIVING MINUS DRIVING) $6,425 -$5,873 -$2,484 $14,636 -$1,991 $2,160
Real 2014$ wages
Percent of Workers in Driving Occupations by 
Race and Hispanic Ethnicity, 2010–2014
Source: Authors’ analysis of American Community Survey data from IPUMS-USA, University of Minnesota, www.ipums.org.
FIGURE E. 
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share. Those of “other” races or 
ethnicities are overrepresented 
as taxi drivers and chauffeurs.
If driving occupations are rapidly 
automated, blacks, Hispanics, 
and American Indians will not 
only lose a greater than average 
share of jobs but also—for the 
median individual who identifies 
as one of these groups—relatively 
high-paying jobs. For these 
groups, the median annual wage 
in driving occupations exceeds 
Number of Workers in Driving Occupations by Occupation,  
Race and Hispanic Ethnicity, and Gender, 2010–2014
Source: Authors’ analysis of American Community Survey data from IPUMS-USA, University of Minnesota, www.ipums.org. M = Men and W = Women.
TABLE 7. 
Average across five years (thousands)
White Hispanic Black Asian
American 
Indian Other Total
M W Total M W Total M W Total M W Total M W Total M W Total M W Total
DRIVING 2230 307 2537 656 61 717 547 106 653 110 4 115 50 9 59 37 5 42 3629 493 4122
NON-DRIVING 48134 44696 92830 11897 9368 21265 6472 8318 14790 3840 3649 7489 927 937 1864 910 909 1820 72181 67877 140057
TOTAL 50364 45003 95367 12553 9428 21981 7019 8424 15442 3950 3653 7603 977 946 1923 947 914 1861 75810 68369 144179
White Hispanic Black Asian
American 
Indian Other Total
M W Total M W Total M W Total M W Total M W Total M W Total M W Total
BUS DRIVERS 177 166 343 42 29 71 86 70 156 10 1 11 5 4 9 4 2 6 325 272 596
DELIVERY 
DRIVERS AND 
HEAVY TRUCK 
DRIVERS
1931 118 2049 564 24 588 389 26 415 59 2 61 41 4 45 27 2 29 3011 176 3187
TAXI DRIVERS 
AND 
CHAUFFEURS
122 24 146 50 8 57 72 10 82 41 1 42 3 1 5 5 1 6 293 45 338
OTHER 48134 44696 92830 11897 9368 21265 6472 8318 14790 3840 3649 7489 927 937 1864 910 909 1820 72181 67877 140057
TOTAL 50364 45003 95367 12553 9428 21981 7019 8424 15442 3950 3653 7603 977 946 1923 947 914 1861 75810 68369 144179
Number of Men in Driving Occupations  
by Race and Ethnicity, 2010-2014
Source: Authors’ analysis of American Community Survey data from IPUMS-USA, University of Minnesota, www.ipums.org.
FIGURE G. 
2,000
1,500
1,000
500
0
Th
ou
sa
nd
s 
(fi
ve
-y
ea
r 
av
er
ag
e)
-15000
-12000 177 86 42
389 564
122 72 50
1,931
BUS DRIVERS TAXI DRIVERS  
AND CHAUFFEURS
DELIVERY DRIVERS AND 
HEAVY TRUCK DRIVERS
White Men
Black Men
Hispanic Men
14
STICK SHIFT
www.globalpolicysolutions.org 
that of non-driving occupations: 
a “driving premium.” The largest 
difference is for Hispanic workers. 
For Hispanics, driving jobs have a 
median annual wage that is more 
than $5,800 higher in real wages 
than for non-driving jobs (table 
6 and figure F). Blacks have the 
second largest discrepancy. For 
Blacks, driving jobs pay nearly 
$2,500 more than non-driving jobs. 
For American Indians, driving jobs 
pay about $2,000 more than non-
driving jobs. For Hispanics, Blacks, 
and American Indians, the loss 
of driving jobs would represent a 
significant loss of better-paying 
work opportunities.
RACE AND GENDER
Table 7 shows the number of 
workers in driving occupations by 
race and gender. White men are by 
far the highest number of workers 
in driving occupations, followed 
by Hispanic men, Black men, and 
White women. This contrasts with 
non-driving occupations, which are 
dominated by White men, followed 
by white women, Hispanic men, 
Hispanic women, Black women, 
and finally Black men.
Delivery drivers and heavy truck 
drivers dominate employment 
among men of every race and 
ethnicity category. (Hispanic 
men in delivery driver and heavy 
truck driver occupations are 
the sole reason that there are 
more Hispanic workers in driving 
Number of Men in Driving and Non-Driving 
Occupations by Race and Ethnicity, 2010-2014
Source: Authors’ analysis of American Community Survey data from IPUMS-USA, University of Minnesota, www.ipums.org.
FIGURE H. 
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occupations; Black men and 
women outnumber Hispanic 
men and women in every other 
occupational category.) Bus 
driver employment among men 
is higher for Blacks, Whites, and 
American Indians than it is for 
taxi drivers and chauffeurs. For 
Hispanics, Asians, and other 
races, taxi employment is greater 
than that of bus drivers. Bus 
driver employment for women 
is higher for White women, 
Hispanic women, and Black 
women than work as delivery and 
heavy truck drivers—for Black and 
Median Annual Wages of Workers in Driving Occupations  
by Occupation, Race and Hispanic Ethnicity, and Gender, 2010-2014
Source: Authors’ analysis of American Community Survey data from IPUMS-USA, University of Minnesota, www.ipums.org. M = Men and W = Women.
TABLE 8. 
Average across five years (thousands)
White Hispanic Black Asian American Indian Other Total
M W
All 
Genders M W
All 
Genders M W
All 
Genders M W
All 
Genders M W
All 
Genders M W
All 
Genders M W
All 
Genders
BUS DRIVERS $20 $18 $19 $30 $22 $26 $32 $22 $26 $32 $26 $31 $21 $20 $21 $32 $26 $28 $25 $20 $22
DELIVERY 
DRIVERS AND 
HEAVY TRUCK 
DRIVERS
$37 $21 $36 $32 $19 $31 $35 $23 $35 $26 $25 $26 $33 $20 $32 $30 $19 $29 $35 $21 $35
TAXI DRIVERS AND 
CHAUFFEURS $20 $15 $19 $23 $21 $22 $22 $18 $21 $25 $21 $25 $22 $20 $20 $23 $20 $23 $22 $17 $21
White Hispanic Black Asian American Indian Other Total
M W
All 
Genders M W
All 
Genders M W
All 
Genders M W
All 
Genders M W
All 
Genders M W
All 
Genders M W
All 
Genders
DRIVING $46 $31 $38 $26 $21 $24 $31 $26 $28 $49 $34 $41 $30 $24 $27 $34 $26 $30 $40 $29 $34
NON-DRIVING $35 $19 $32 $31 $21 $30 $33 $22 $31 $26 $23 $26 $30 $20 $29 $29 $23 $28 $33 $20 $31
ALL OCCUPATIONS $46 $31 $38 $26 $21 $24 $31 $26 $28 $47 $34 $41 $30 $24 $27 $34 $26 $30 $40 $29 $34
DIFFERENCE 
(NON-DRIVING 
MINUS DRIVING)
$12 $12 $6 -$5 $0 -$6 -$2 $5 -$2 $23 $11 $15 $0 $4 -$2 $5 $3 $2 $8 $9 $3
Driving Premium by Race and Hispanic 
Ethnicity and Gender, 2010–2014
Source: Authors’ analysis of American Community Survey data from IPUMS-USA, University of Minnesota, www.ipums.org.
FIGURE K. 
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White women it is much higher 
(70,000 and 166,00 versus 26,000 
and 118,000, respectively).
Figures G and H show the 
breakdown between White, Black, 
and Hispanic men by driving 
occupations, and by type of 
occupation, respectively. White 
men vastly outnumber Black 
men in delivery driver and heavy 
trucking occupations (about five 
to one), but not for bus drivers 
(about two to one), or taxi drivers 
and chauffeurs (about 1.7 to 
one). There are about four times 
as many White men in driving 
occupations than Black men, but 
about 7.5 times as many White 
men in non-driving occupations.
Median annual wages vary 
considerably by race/ethnicity 
and gender. The median annual 
wages in Table 8 vary from 
$37,000 (White male delivery 
drivers and heavy truck drivers) 
to $15,000 (White female taxi 
drivers and chauffeurs). Men 
are paid more across every 
occupation and race and 
gender category.
Figure I (for men) and figure 
J (for women) show median 
annual wages by race/ethnicity 
and gender. Generally, taxi 
drivers and chauffeurs are 
paid less than the other two 
occupational categories, which 
vary between highest paid and 
second highest paid.
Number and Share of Workers in Driving 
Occupations by Educational Attainment, 2010–2014
Source: Authors’ analysis of American Community Survey data from IPUMS-USA, University of Minnesota, www.ipums.org.
TABLE 9. 
Less than 
High School
High 
School
Some 
College College Advanced Total
BUS DRIVERS 55,458 270,111 218,633 41,382 10,629 596,213
DELIVERY DRIVERS 
AND HEAVY 
TRUCK DRIVERS
555,011 1,529,129 929,694 147,537 25,675 3,187,046
TAXI DRIVERS  
AND CHAUFFEURS 50,868 124,722 106,528 44,111 12,138 338,366
ALL 
OCCUPATIONS 14,077,165 36,247,865 47,229,920 29,608,960 17,014,928 144,178,839
Average across five years
Less than 
High School
High 
School
Some 
College College Advanced Total
NON-DRIVING 13,415,829 34,323,903 45,975,066 29,375,931 16,966,486 140,057,214
DRIVING 661,336 1,923,962 1,254,855 233,030 48,441 4,121,625
ALL 
OCCUPATIONS 14,077,165 36,247,865 47,229,920 29,608,960 17,014,928 144,178,839
Average across five years
Less than 
High School
High 
School
Some 
College College Advanced
BUS DRIVERS 9.30 45.3 36.67 6.94 1.78
DELIVERY DRIVERS 
AND HEAVY 
TRUCK DRIVERS
17.41 47.98 29.17 4.63 0.81
TAXI DRIVERS  
AND CHAUFFEURS 15.03 36.86 31.48 13.04 3.59
ALL 
OCCUPATIONS 9.76 25.14 32.76 20.54 11.80
Educational distribution of workers by  occupation
Less than 
High School
High 
School
Some 
College College Advanced
NON-DRIVING 9.58 24.51 32.83 20.97 12.11
DRIVING 16.05 46.68 30.45 5.65 1.18
ALL 
OCCUPATIONS 9.76 25.14 32.76 20.54 11.80
Educational distribution of workers by  occupation
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Figure K shows the driving 
premium for specific groups. The 
groups with a driving premium 
are Hispanic men and black men.
EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT
Table 9 shows the educational 
distribution of workers by 
occupation (see figures L and 
M as well). Generally, workers 
in driving occupations are more 
likely than workers in non-driving 
occupations to have less than 
a bachelor’s degree. Among 
workers in driving occupations, 
93.17 percent have less than a 
college degree, compared with 
66.91 percent of workers in non-
driving occupations. Compared 
to the overall workforce, those 
in driving occupations are 
significantly overrepresented at 
the high school diploma level 
(25.14 percent of the overall 
workforce and 46.68 percent 
of the driving workforce). 
Correspondingly, these driving 
occupations are significantly 
underrepresented at the college 
and advanced education levels. 
Driving occupations represent 
a significant source of work 
for those with lower levels of 
educational attainment.
STATES
In the United States overall, 2.86 percent of workers 
are employed in driving occupations, but the share 
of workers in driving occupations varies by state. 
The top five states in rank order are Mississippi (3.70 
percent), Wyoming (3.64 percent), West Virginia 
(3.60), Idaho (3.45 percent), and North Dakota (3.44 
percent) (Table 10).
In terms of absolute number of workers in driving 
occupations, however, larger states rank more 
highly. California (432,000), Texas (353,000), New 
York (282,000), Florida (224,000), and Illinois 
Distribution of Workers by  
Educational Attainment and Occupation
Source: Authors’ analysis of American Community Survey data from IPUMS-USA, University of Minnesota, www.ipums.org.
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(189,000) are the five states with 
the most workers in driving 
occupations.
Figure N shows the percent of 
workers in driving occupations in 
each state via a choropleth using 
a five-bucket Jenks natural breaks 
optimization. States with darker 
buckets have a higher percentage 
of workers in driving occupations.
For workers in eight states, 
driving jobs pay more than 
$1,000 a year over non-driving 
jobs. They are North Dakota 
($4,363 more), Utah ($3,194 
more), Idaho ($2,934 more), 
Wyoming ($2,096 more), West 
Virginia ($1,999 more), Arkansas 
($1,946 more), Iowa ($1,476 more), 
and Mississippi ($1,031 more) 
(table 11 and figure O).
Figure O visually compares the 
driving premium in each state. 
States within darker buckets have 
a higher driving premium.
The states that would be hit 
hardest by a rapid shift to 
autonomous vehicles are 
the states where workers are 
overrepresented in driving 
occupations and where driving 
occupations pay significantly 
more than non-driving 
occupations. Figure P combines 
these two characteristics to 
map the states that would be hit 
hardest by adding together the 
Number and Percent of Workers in Driving 
Occupations by State, 2010–2014
Source: Authors’ analysis of American Community Survey data from IPUMS-USA, University of Minnesota, www.ipums.org.
TABLE 10. 
State Number Percent Percent Rank (Highest to Lowest)
MISSISSIPPI 44,443 3.70 1
WYOMING 10,682 3.64 2
WEST VIRGINIA 27,125 3.60 3
IDAHO 24,425 3.45 4
NORTH DAKOTA 13,202 3.44 4
ARKANSAS 42,815 3.42 6
IOWA 51,496 3.30 7
KENTUCKY 61,615 3.28 8
ALABAMA 65,460 3.25 9
INDIANA 96,467 3.22 10
MISSOURI 89,509 3.20 11
LOUISIANA 63,298 3.14 12
ILLINOIS 188,673 3.13 13
OKLAHOMA 53,940 3.13 13
NEW JERSEY 131,802 3.11 15
PENNSYLVANIA 184,340 3.10 15
NEW YORK 281,554 3.08 17
GEORGIA 133,043 3.07 18
OHIO 161,806 3.05 19
TENNESSEE 86,476 3.04 20
DELAWARE 12,682 2.97 21
TEXAS 353,040 2.97 22
SOUTH DAKOTA 12,560 2.94 23
NEVADA 36,428 2.92 24
WISCONSIN 82,871 2.91 25
NORTH CAROLINA 125,007 2.86 26
SOUTH CAROLINA 58,457 2.84 27
MAINE 18,133 2.81 28
NEBRASKA 26,800 2.78 29
MINNESOTA 77,286 2.77 30
KANSAS 38,588 2.75 30
MICHIGAN 117,057 2.73 32
NEW MEXICO 23,837 2.71 33
OREGON 47,370 2.70 34
FLORIDA 224,358 2.68 35
WASHINGTON 84,873 2.62 36
MARYLAND 77,179 2.60 37
MONTANA 12,339 2.56 38
RHODE ISLAND 13,113 2.55 39
UTAH 33,223 2.55 39
CALIFORNIA 431,918 2.54 41
COLORADO 65,021 2.51 42
VERMONT 8,076 2.48 43
VIRGINIA 100,124 2.48 44
HAWAII 16,856 2.45 45
ALASKA 8,959 2.44 46
NEW HAMPSHIRE 16,935 2.44 47
ARIZONA 66,760 2.41 47
MASSACHUSETTS 75,475 2.26 49
CONNECTICUT 38,900 2.19 50
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 5,227 1.60 51
TOTAL 4,121,625 2.86
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state rankings from tables 10 and 
11 to create a simple index. The 
states that are most vulnerable 
according to this index are North 
Dakota, Idaho, Wyoming, West 
Virginia, Mississippi, Arkansas, 
and Iowa. (The District of 
Columbia is by far the least 
vulnerable, ranking dead last 
by both driver premium and 
percentage of the population in 
driving occupations.)
These states would likely be 
hardest hit by wide-scale 
adoption of autonomous-
vehicle technology that targeted 
the sorts of driving jobs they 
support. This is because these 
driving jobs pay more than non-
driving jobs, and they represent 
a more significant portion of 
these states’ employment. 
Widespread unemployment 
in the driving occupations in 
these states could lead to many 
people out of work and forced 
to take lower-paying jobs.
UNIONS
Table 12 and figure Q show the 
share of workers in driving and 
non-driving occupations by union 
status. Among workers in driving 
occupations, 15.68 percent 
are union members, over 4 
percentage points higher than the 
11.31 percent of unionized workers 
in non-driving occupations. Only  
11.44 of workers overall are union 
members.
Number and Percent of Workers  
in Driving Occupations by State, 2010–2014
FIGURE N. 
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Driving Premium by State, 2010–2014
Source: Authors’ analysis of American Community Survey data from IPUMS-USA, University of Minnesota, www.ipums.org. 
Choropleth uses a five-bucket Jenks natural breaks optimization.  
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This suggests that driving 
jobs, on average, may have 
more advantages for workers 
than similar occupations with 
lower union membership rates, 
especially for non-White workers.20
HEALTH INSURANCE
Health insurance rates vary 
by driving and non-driving 
occupations as well. From 
2010 to 2014, 77.14 percent of 
workers in driving occupations 
had health insurance, versus 
84.08 percent of workers 
in non-driving occupations 
(table 13 and figure R). This 
represented about 940,000 
workers in driving occupations 
without health insurance. For 
FIGURE P. 
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States Rank Index (Driver Premium Rank Plus 
Percentage of Workers in Driving Occupations), 
2010–2014
Share of Workers in Driving 
Occupations by Union 
Membership Status, 2010–2014
Source: Authors’ analysis of CEPR extract of Current Population Survey Outgoing 
Rotation Group data. www.CEPRdata.org.
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employer-sponsored health 
insurance, driving occupations 
had a rate of 60.58 percent, 
lagging behind non-driving 
occupations at 69.24. Because 
many drivers are employed 
on a contract basis, employer-
sponsored health insurance 
may be offered to these 
workers at a lower rate.21 
Because only one-fifth of the 
data in these averages is after 
the implementation of the 
Affordable Care Act, the rate 
of insured drivers might be 
trending higher in recent years.
The lower health insurance rates 
for driving occupations may 
reflect the dichotomy that while 
many driving jobs are unionized, 
many others are contract-based. 
Unionized jobs are more likely 
to provide health insurance than 
non-union or contract jobs.22
POVERTY
Table 14 shows the number and 
percent of workers in driving 
and non-driving occupations, 
by poverty status. There are 
about 300,000 workers in 
driving occupations living in 
poverty, compared with about 
11.3 million workers in non-
driving occupations. Driving 
occupations have a slightly lower 
share of workers in poverty 
compared to non-driving 
occupations, 7.32 percent versus 
8.08 percent. Workers in driving 
Median Annual Wage for Workers in Driving  
and Non-Driving Occupations by State, 2010–2014
Source: Authors’ analysis of American Community Survey data from IPUMS-USA, University of Minnesota, www.ipums.org.
TABLE 11. 
State Non-Driving Driving Non-Driving minus Driving Wage-Difference Rank
NORTH DAKOTA $32,481 $36,843 -$4,363 1
UTAH $30,491 $33,685 -$3,194 2
IDAHO $28,000 $30,934 -$2,934 3
WYOMING $34,747 $36,843 -$2,096 4
WEST VIRGINIA $30,001 $32,000 -$1,999 5
ARKANSAS $28,458 $30,404 -$1,946 6
IOWA $32,524 $34,000 -$1,476 7
MISSISSIPPI $28,872 $29,903 -$1,031 8
SOUTH DAKOTA $30,000 $30,694 -$694 9
MONTANA $28,458 $29,000 -$542 10
TENNESSEE $30,491 $30,934 -$443 11
INDIANA $31,580 $31,965 -$385 11
NEW MEXICO $30,000 $30,000 $0 13
OKLAHOMA $30,491 $30,491 $0 13
WISCONSIN $32,829 $32,576 $253 13
KENTUCKY $30,404 $30,000 $404 16
MISSOURI $31,000 $30,491 $509 17
TEXAS $32,524 $32,000 $524 18
NEBRASKA $31,580 $31,000 $580 19
LOUISIANA $31,580 $30,934 $646 19
OREGON $31,580 $30,694 $886 21
ALABAMA $30,934 $30,000 $934 22
MICHIGAN $31,800 $30,527 $1,273 23
SOUTH CAROLINA $30,404 $28,872 $1,532 24
KANSAS $32,068 $30,491 $1,577 25
NEVADA $32,524 $30,934 $1,590 26
OHIO $32,524 $30,934 $1,590 27
NORTH CAROLINA $30,934 $28,872 $2,062 28
ARIZONA $32,524 $30,317 $2,207 29
GEORGIA $32,000 $29,475 $2,525 30
ILLINOIS $35,791 $33,000 $2,791 31
VERMONT $33,540 $30,694 $2,846 32
PENNSYLVANIA $35,000 $31,965 $3,035 33
CALIFORNIA $35,058 $32,000 $3,058 34
FLORIDA $30,491 $27,146 $3,345 35
MINNESOTA $36,589 $33,000 $3,589 36
MAINE $31,580 $27,798 $3,782 37
RHODE ISLAND $36,000 $31,965 $4,035 38
WASHINGTON $38,000 $33,685 $4,315 39
COLORADO $36,090 $31,580 $4,510 40
NEW HAMPSHIRE $38,005 $32,524 $5,481 41
HAWAII $35,573 $30,000 $5,573 42
DELAWARE $37,121 $30,934 $6,187 43
ALASKA $41,163 $34,000 $7,163 44
NEW YORK $38,152 $30,934 $7,218 45
VIRGINIA $39,130 $29,427 $9,703 46
MARYLAND $43,907 $33,540 $10,367 47
NEW JERSEY $43,434 $33,000 $10,434 48
CONNECTICUT $42,107 $30,934 $11,173 49
MASSACHUSETTS $42,107 $30,491 $11,616 50
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA $52,633 $35,573 $17,060 51
Real 2014$ wages
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occupations also have a poverty 
rate that is lower than the overall 
workforce (the overall poverty 
rate is 8.06 percent).
This is further evidence that 
driving jobs, on the whole, are 
“good jobs.” While they may not 
be higher-paying jobs for every 
demographic, fewer drivers are 
in poverty.
Share of Workers in Driving 
Occupations by Union 
Membership Status, 2010–2014 Non-Union Union Member
NON-DRIVING 88.69 11.31
DRIVING 84.32 15.68
ALL OCCUPATIONS 88.56 11.44
Source: Authors’ analysis of CEPR extract of Current Population Survey Outgoing Rotation Group data. www.CEPRdata.org.
TABLE 12. 
Average across five years
Number and Percent of Workers in Driving and  
Non-Driving Occupations with Health Insurance, 2010–2014
Source: Authors’ analysis of American Community Survey data from IPUMS-USA, University of Minnesota, www.ipums.org.
TABLE 13. 
Without any health insurance With any health insurance
Total,
with and without health insurance
NON-DRIVING 22,297,623 117,759,591 140,057,214
DRIVING 942,106 3,179,519 4,121,625
ALL OCCUPATIONS 23,239,729 120,939,110 144,178,839
Number of Workers
Without any health insurance With any health insurance
NON-DRIVING 15.92 84.08
DRIVING 22.86 77.14
ALL OCCUPATIONS 16.12 83.88
Percent of workers within 
each occupation category
Without employer health insurance With employer health insurance
Total,
with and without employer health insurance
NON-DRIVING 43,084,781 96,972,433 140,057,214
DRIVING 1,624,607 2,497,018 4,121,625
ALL OCCUPATIONS 44,709,388 99,469,451 144,178,839
Number of Workers
Without employer health insurance With employer health insurance
NON-DRIVING 30.76 69.24
DRIVING 39.42 60.58
ALL OCCUPATIONS 31.01 68.99
Percent of workers within 
each occupation category
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SUMMARY
The analysis in these sections helps us to explain 
which part of the labor market could be affected by 
autonomous-vehicle technology.
What kinds of jobs are these?
 Delivery drivers and heavy trucking drivers 
dominate the driving occupations analyzed.
 There could be important intra-category 
differences. For example, local delivery 
drivers might have very different jobs and 
tasks than long-haul truckers.
 There are likely large differences in the 
working conditions and pay of unionized 
versus non-unionized (or contract worker) 
bus drivers, taxi drivers, and delivery and 
heavy truck drivers.23
Who relies on these jobs?
 Men dominate the category of delivery and 
heavy truck drivers as well as the category of 
taxi drivers and chauffeurs.
 About the same number of women as men 
are employed as bus drivers.
 Whites are underrepresented in these 
occupations as a whole. Blacks, Hispanics, 
and American Indians are overrepresented. 
Asians and those of other races are 
overrepresented as taxi drivers.
 White men dominate the delivery drivers and 
heavy trucking drivers category. Hispanic 
women, Black women, and Black men have 
significant employment as bus drivers.
 Driving occupations represent a significant 
Number and Percent of Workers in Driving  
and Non-Driving Occupations Not Living in Poverty, 2010–2014
Source: Authors’ analysis of American Community Survey data from IPUMS-USA, University of Minnesota, www.ipums.org.
TABLE 14. 
Not in Poverty Poor
Total,
Any Poverty Status
NON-DRIVING 128,733,661 11,323,553 140,057,214
DRIVING 3,819,830 301,794 4,121,625
ALL OCCUPATIONS 132,553,491 11,625,348 144,178,839
Number of Workers
Not in Poverty Poor
NON-DRIVING 91.92 8.08
DRIVING 92.68 7.32
ALL OCCUPATIONS 91.94 8.06
Percent of workers within 
each occupation category
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source of work for those with lower levels of 
educational attainment.
 The states where workers are 
overrepresented in driving occupations and 
where driving occupations pay significantly 
more than non-driving occupations are North 
Dakota, Idaho, Wyoming, West Virginia, 
Mississippi, Arkansas, and Iowa.
Are these good jobs?
 Driving occupations earn less overall than 
non-driving occupations24
 Hispanic men and Black men in driving 
occupations have significant driving premiums 
compared with their non-driving counterparts.
 Men and women both have large negative 
driving premiums.
 Blacks, Hispanics, and American Indians have 
driving premiums.
 Across the board, by race alone, or by both 
gender and race, non-whites make more 
than their whites counterparts as bus drivers 
and as taxi drivers and chauffeurs25
 Men of any race are paid more than women 
of any race in all categories.
 Men are paid highest as delivery drivers and 
heavy truck drivers, with the exception of 
Asian men and men of other races, who are 
paid most as bus drivers.
 Those in driving occupations are more likely 
to be unionized than their peers in non-
driving occupations.
 Drivers are slightly less likely to be living in 
federally defined poverty than non-drivers.
 Drivers are less likely to have health insurance 
than are non-drivers (this likely reverses 
among drivers who have union jobs).
SECTION 2: 
PREPARING FOR  
EMPLOYMENT DISRUPTIONS
If there is a relatively rapid transition to autonomous-
vehicle technology, four million workers will be at risk 
of unemployment. The previous section identified 
specific groups that should be targeted specifically 
for assistance. This is because these groups are 
disproportionately represented or because they 
receive premiums in their driving jobs, for example. 
In addition, the previous section explored the 
differences between occupations and discussed 
possible differences within occupations (for instance 
between unionized and non-unionized jobs). All 
available information about the workers impacted 
should be used to develop policy prescriptions to 
address this problem.
In the current political climate, policies are more 
likely to be adopted sooner if proposals are directed 
to states rather than the federal government.26 
Possibilities at the state level include minimum-wage 
hikes and policies such as paid sick and family leave. 
Yet, there are federal-level policies, such as basic 
income, automatic Medicaid eligibility, and fully 
funded job-training and relocation assistance that 
should also be considered and adopted.
In general, it is necessary to make certain that there 
is an adequate safety net, job-placement services, 
educational and training opportunities, and new 
jobs that can support these workers if they need 
to transition to new employment. Some analysts 
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are concerned that other new technologies will 
also lead to significant job losses at least in the 
short term.27 The reforms necessary to prepare 
for autonomous-vehicle technology will likely be 
beneficial in addressing other labor market shocks 
due to technology.
PREPARE FOR AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES 
WITH APPROPRIATE REGULATION
One simple way to make the labor market shock from 
autonomous vehicles more bearable is to make sure 
that they undergo adequate safety testing and that 
they are appropriately regulated. Although the extent 
of what is necessary would no doubt be something 
automotive firms would debate, independent experts 
should determine the appropriate rules. In addition, 
automotive firms, not the public, should pay for the 
infrastructure required by autonomous vehicles. As 
cities declare plans to move toward less and less car 
use, it does not make sense for them to subsidize 
well-capitalized companies.28 That money can go to 
better use addressing the labor market impacts of the 
technology.
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE  
REFORM AND RETRAINING
Unemployment insurance (UI) can keep laid-off 
workers and their families out of poverty.29 The 
program, however, has not been given sufficient 
resources to meet demand. In 2015, only about 
a quarter of the jobless received UI—a historic 
low.30 Further, even before the Great Recession 
(2007–2009), the length of unemployment spells for 
average and median workers had been following 
an upward trend over time,31 while states have been 
reducing the number of weeks laid-off workers are 
eligible for unemployment insurance. It is important 
that unemployed workers be allowed 26 weeks of 
coverage. During a recession, it will take longer 
for the unemployed to find work. The duration of 
unemployment insurance coverage should also 
be automatically extended during periods of high 
unemployment.32 In addition, UI should kick in 
automatically for eligible workers, as should other 
benefits for which workers are eligible. This should 
improve take-up rates. The policies discussed 
here are especially important for the states most 
vulnerable to these employment disruptions: North 
Dakota, Idaho, Wyoming, West Virginia, Mississippi, 
Arkansas, and Iowa.
Additional reforms could make the UI program more 
effective at reconnecting workers to employment. 
The re-employment services and employment 
assistance and job placement provided by the 
American Job Centers connected to the UI program 
have been shown to be cost-effective, leading to 
shorter periods spent collecting UI and to higher 
earnings. Yet these programs have not been 
adequately funded.33 Funding for these programs 
needs to be increased and benefits adjusted so that 
they can deal adequately with contemporary levels of 
unemployment as well as the type of retraining and 
education it will take to get displaced workers hired 
into comparable or better jobs. In these cases, the 
period for using UI should be extended to allow the 
benefit recipient to complete his or her education 
or retraining. The program should also provide 
relocation grants so that individuals can move to 
areas where they desire to live in order to find a job.34
Related policies could include ending at-will 
dismissal at the state level. Montana has this 
provision for workers on the job for more than six 
months. In addition, mandating severance pay based 
on service would provide employees a cushion if 
they were about to be replaced by an autonomous 
vehicle (Germany has a policy like this).35 This 
would give soon-to-be laid-off drivers considerable 
leverage in how they end their relationship with their 
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employers. If there were no threat of layoffs, workers 
would have a degree of job security that could 
facilitate union organizing.
APPRENTICESHIP PROGRAMS
Workers displaced from driving occupations will need 
to move into new careers. In many cases, this move will 
require retraining. Apprenticeships are an ideal way for 
these workers to earn a salary while learning the skills 
for a new occupation. Apprentice programs could 
proactively help displaced drivers and help them 
map their skills and interests on other related, allied, 
or newly created occupations. It typically costs much 
less to prepare a worker through an apprenticeship 
program than through community college, for 
example.36 Every dollar spent on apprenticeship 
returns $1.47 in increased productivity, reduced waste, 
and greater innovation.37 In the United States, only 0.2 
percent of the labor force is enrolled in apprenticeship 
programs, but the share is 2.2 percent in Canada 
and 3.7 percent in Germany.36 More funding should 
be put into increasing the share of apprenticeships 
in the labor force so that the rate in the United States 
approaches the rates found in nations like Canada 
and Germany. If there were more apprenticeships 
available for workers of all ages, there would be more 
opportunities for former drivers to transition into new 
careers. These new programs should take into account 
lessons from Germany, both the technical aspects 
of the implementation and the German cultural 
attitudes that enable the success of the programs.37 
Apprenticeships could likely be a good fit for former 
drivers as well.
UNIONS
A discussion about major changes in the 
transportation sector can’t occur without mentioning 
active unions like the Amalgamated Transit Union and 
Teamsters. In total, they comprise almost 1.5 million 
members, and they represent bus drivers and truck 
drivers, among other non-transportation-related 
occupations. Given the wage and benefits premiums 
of union membership, especially for people of color, 
the expansion of union membership should be a 
primary concern for those interested in creating 
good jobs.40 In periods of technological change, 
unions can advocate for workers (for example, by 
extracting concessions related to the retraining of 
laid-off workers) and help with transitions to different 
jobs within the industries represented by the union 
(sometimes via apprenticeships).
AFFORDABLE HIGHER EDUCATION
More than nine in 10 (93.17 percent) workers in 
driving occupations do not have a college degree.41 
If drivers are displaced by autonomous vehicles, 
some may wish to obtain a college degree or other 
postsecondary training to enhance their skills as they 
change careers. Today, many adults beyond their 
early 20s pursue additional education to advance 
their careers. In 2014, 41 percent of students in 
degree-granting institutions were over 24 years old. 
Eighteen percent were over 34 years old.42
Cost will be the big obstacle facing former drivers 
who want to pursue higher education. In just a few 
decades, there has been a radical transformation in 
the cost of postsecondary education. Demos reports:
As recently as the early 1990s, most students 
did not borrow to attain a degree. But now, 
nearly three-in-four graduates take on debt for a 
degree, and average debt for those who attain a 
bachelor’s degree has reached $30,000. Even a 
growing number—over 40 percent—of associate 
degree holders take on debt, something that 
runs counter to idea of an “affordable” two-year 
degree that acts as a standalone credential or a 
pathway to the bachelor’s.43
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This increase in the cost of going to college is largely 
the result of a decline in public investment in higher 
education.44 If former drivers want to pursue a 
college education as a path to a new career, there 
must be an increase in public investment in higher 
education to make it more affordable, adequate 
support structures in place for these largely 
nontraditional students, and off-ramps from college 
to jobs.
Affordable higher education, even with supports, is 
not enough to solve the problems associated with 
mass unemployment from autonomous-vehicle 
technology, nor is it a panacea for social or labor 
market problems. Obtaining a college or advanced 
degree does not guarantee labor market success. 
In fact, research has shown that the connection 
between educational attainment and future labor 
market success can at times be tenuous at best, 
especially for workers of color.45
PROGRESSIVE BASIC INCOME
The idea of providing a basic income for all workers 
precedes the current debate over technology and the 
future of work.46 However, some leaders have picked 
up the call with renewed zeal in anticipation of sizable 
job losses due to artificial intelligence, machine 
learning, and automation. Since the efficiency of 
today’s technological advancements may outpace 
humankind’s ability to replace automated jobs 
with new jobs for humans, it would be prudent to 
establish a basic income to offset the likely potential 
for seismic changes in the labor market.
The United States already has an infrastructure for 
delivering basic income: Social Security.  A critical 
social insurance program created in 1935, Social 
Security provides monthly income to workers who 
retire or become disabled, and to the dependents 
of workers who die.  The program already has 
mechanisms for identifying all eligible workers 
(the Social Security number), keeping track of and 
collecting revenue from employment (a payroll 
tax shared by employers and workers), a way of 
accounting for the revenue collected (the Social 
Security Trust Funds), and a way of disbursing monthly 
revenue to recipients (direct deposit and checks).
In the event that moderate to liberal estimates of 
projected job losses proves likely, Social Security 
should be expanded to accommodate a progressive 
basic income (PBI) that insures workers and their 
dependents against the risk of losing their jobs to 
automation. PBI benefits should be distributed on 
a progressive scale—corresponding to the worker’s 
estimated pre-job loss income levels —in an effort to 
ensure economic security for vulnerable households. 
The PBI would not take the place of Social Security’s 
existing benefits for retirees, the disabled, or the 
survivors of workers who have died.
Changes would be needed in order to accommodate 
a basic income where it is presumed that workers 
may not always be able to contribute through 
a payroll tax. These limitations can be offset by 
alternative financing approaches that could tap the 
enhanced revenue companies would likely realize as 
a result of increased technological efficiencies.47
AUTOMATIC MEDICAID ELIGIBILITY
Workers who lose their jobs to automation will not 
be able to purchase basic necessities for themselves 
and their families without assistance. Federal 
and state governments should expand Medicaid 
eligibility to automatically cover displaced workers 
with household incomes below a determined level. 
This type of assistance will enable workers to protect 
their health and wallets while they obtain additional 
education or training and/or find a new job.
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ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
PROGRAMS AND INCENTIVES
Entrepreneurship may be an important way to 
generate new jobs for humans in a labor market 
shaped by the growing influence of autonomous 
technology. Yet, there must be sizable investments 
in building pipelines to viable entrepreneurship for 
youth who are not guaranteed jobs of the future 
and for displaced workers seeking new options in 
the economy. The best way to increase exposure 
to and facility with the principles and practices 
of entrepreneurship for youth is to insert age-
appropriate entrepreneurship and financial literacy 
education into the elementary and secondary 
education system, with a special focus on designing 
experiential entrepreneurship programs connected 
to real-world business opportunities at the high 
school level. Displaced workers who are interested in 
entrepreneurship should have business training and 
development opportunities that are linked to capital 
access and ongoing technical assistance opportunities.
A FULL EMPLOYMENT POLICY GOAL
The more jobs there are, the easier it will be for laid-
off drivers to find new work. Furthermore, when there 
is an ample supply of jobs relative to the number of 
workers, wages tend to increase because employers 
have to compete more for workers. Thus, the more 
the country maintains a state of full employment the 
easier it will be for drivers to transition to new jobs, 
and to jobs that might pay as well as driving jobs.
Some economists argue that federal macroeconomic 
policies have prevented the United States from 
reaching and maintaining its highest levels of 
employment. They argue that the Federal Reserve’s 
target for inflation is too low and that the Federal 
Reserve puts the brakes on job growth before we 
truly reach full employment by raising interest rates 
(i.e., by tightening monetary policy). They also point 
out that the Federal Reserve is very responsive to 
demands to raise interest rates even when there is 
still a good deal of slack in the labor market and no 
evidence of rising inflation.48 In addition, if exports 
were balanced with imports, jobs would not be lost 
to the trade deficit. They also argue that more public 
investments—in infrastructure, in education, and in 
research and development—would help maximize 
job growth.49 In total, expansionary monetary policy 
along with fiscal stimulus are key to reaching full 
employment during economic recoveries.
Some populations face persistently high 
unemployment in good and bad economic times. 
The Black and American Indian unemployment rates 
tend to be about twice the White unemployment 
rate, and the Hispanic unemployment rate tends 
to be about 1.5 times the white rate year after year, 
decade after decade.50 The unemployment rate 
for Black teens averages a staggering six times the 
White teen unemployment rate.51 These populations 
will disproportionately benefit from better monetary 
and fiscal policies. But in order for these populations 
to participate in the economy at the same rates as 
Whites, targeted employment strategies for these 
groups are needed. These should include sectoral-
employment strategies with a strong emphasis on job 
placement and training and coaching, wage subsidies, 
and the direct creation of jobs by the government.52 
Full employment should mean full employment for all 
racial and ethnic groups, not just for some.
It is important to note that even targeted policies 
may not lead to participation of these populations in 
the labor market at the same rates as Whites. This is 
because joblessness is a complicated social problem 
with many different causes and contributing factors. 
Absent a fundamental reorientation of the economy 
and social norms, it is unlikely that the underlying 
conditions will completely change. This is not an 
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argument to avoid pursuing these targeted policies, 
however. It is an argument for further expansion of 
the government’s ability to provide jobs to anyone, an 
idea known as a universal job guarantee, which has 
increasingly gained favor by some economists.53 If 
worthwhile jobs were provided to those who need and 
want them, labor force participation rates would rise 
significantly, and racial disparities would likely shrink 
substantially, even in the short term.54 A job guarantee 
would not solve underlying disparities, but it would 
achieve the desired outcome. A job guarantee 
program could also be combined with retraining 
programs that emulate a real work environment, 
thus combining the benefits of both.55 An expansive 
and accessible job guarantee program would be 
able to handle disruptions to the labor market like 
autonomous-vehicle technology might cause.
Lastly, work sharing is an important stopgap to 
layoffs. Employees would be moved to reduced 
hours instead of being laid off, allowing them to 
keep some of the benefits of being employed 
and allowing the employer to retain the skills and 
institutional knowledge of employees. This would 
be useful for a transition to autonomous-vehicle 
technology, and blunt the effect from it. Twenty-
one states (including California and New York) 
already have an apparatus on the books to allow 
for work sharing.56 Germany used work sharing 
with great success during the Great Recession; its 
unemployment rate actually decreased during the 
recession.57 In a similar vein, states can mandate that 
employees take paid leave, including paid vacation, 
to create jobs and reduce unemployment. This 
would bring the length of the average workweek in 
the United States closer to that of other countries.58
Achieving and maintaining full employment is an 
important policy priority for an economy in which 
individuals who lose jobs to technology can find new, 
good jobs without too much difficulty.
RESISTING THE GIG ECONOMY AND 
FIGHTING FOR GOOD JOBS
Turning jobs into “gigs,” or contract employment, is 
a trend bolstered by Silicon Valley in recent years. 
This trend did not start with Silicon Valley companies, 
however. In just one example, port truckers have 
faced particularly harsh conditions in recent years 
due to employment misclassification. They bear all 
costs from their work (gas, maintenance, insurance), 
have little control over their schedules, and do not 
have any of the legal protections of employees (like 
those from minimum-wage and overtime laws).59 
Ride-hailing companies like Uber and Lyft have 
misclassified their workers as well, and those workers 
face many of the same challenges as port workers.
As part of this trend, companies have advocated 
for an “independent worker” category between an 
employee and a contract worker, which marries the 
downsides of both statuses into a new category. This 
category also comes with the promise of “portable 
benefits,” or a 401(k)-type system that would provide 
benefits such as sick leave across employers.60
These developments should be met with much 
skepticism, as they erode worker power and result in a 
race to the bottom in wages and working conditions. 
It is also troubling that this misclassification and new 
employment category are targeted at transportation 
occupations, like some of those analyzed in this paper.
Any labor market shocks caused by autonomous-
vehicle technology would hit contract workers 
hardest. In addition, if misclassification is tolerated, 
or if the “independent worker” category gains 
traction, these systems could be used to justify 
paying poverty wages to drivers once autonomous-
vehicle technology arrives. Workers in this position 
would have very little bargaining power and would 
likely have very poor working conditions.
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As demonstrated, there are ample opportunities 
for policymakers to prepare for large labor market 
shocks. Even if autonomous-vehicle technology were 
a bust, these policies would be useful in dealing 
with other labor market shocks or recessions. In 
addition, they would transfer bargaining power 
back to workers, and improve the labor market 
overall. While the chance of mass unemployment 
due to autonomous-vehicle technology requires 
serious scrutiny, these policies would also be quite 
popular among workers, including potentially 
disillusioned workers who face the prospect of mass 
unemployment (the kind of blue-collar workers often 
talked about in the aftermath of the 2016 presidential 
election). On top of that, these policies would change 
the landscape of power in the workplace, and they 
would defang the threat of mass unemployment due 
to technology that is often used to undercut worker 
power regardless of whether it actually exists.
SECTION 3 
THE LIKELIHOOD AND 
THE IMPACT OF A RAPID 
TRANSITION TO AUTONOMOUS-
VEHICLE TECHNOLOGY
Two questions are central to evaluating the labor 
market disruptions of fully or near-fully autonomous-
vehicle technology:
 How fast will the technology develop?
 How much of an impact will it have?
This section summarizes the debates on these 
pertinent questions.
ON THE LIKELIHOOD OF A RAPID 
TRANSITION TO AUTONOMOUS-VEHICLE 
TECHNOLOGY
A vehicle is fully autonomous at Level 5 on the SAE 
scale of autonomous-vehicle technology.61, 62 The 
previously mentioned computer-controlled Uber 
truck that delivered beer between two cities in 
Colorado in October 2016 was a test of a Level 4 
vehicle, or a vehicle that can perform all critical 
driving functions.63 Given the progress already made 
and the number of companies working on advancing 
autonomous-vehicle technology, it is possible that 
there will be progress to Level 5—full autonomy 
without human involvement—in the near future. Many 
economists, pundits, and companies are predicting 
just that.
If autonomous vehicles are to replace traditional 
driving jobs, they will need to be fully—or close to 
fully—autonomous. There is considerable variation in 
forecasts for when autonomous vehicles will reach 
the market.64
There are many caveats to these forecasts. The 
transition from Level 3 or Level 4 to fully autonomous 
Level 5 technology might be the hardest step; 
previous development is not necessarily indicative of 
future progress; and gradual progress toward fully 
autonomous vehicles ignores the dramatic leap in 
technology needed. For example, there is a large 
difference between the capabilities of a computer 
that has a human backup and that is only sometimes 
in control, and that of a computer that can handle 
every situation it might encounter—even situations 
that might befuddle human drivers.65
Some firms are counting on jumping directly to 
fully autonomous technology in anticipation of 
this problem. In part, this is because technology 
aimed at completely removing drivers (and driver 
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controls)—Level 5 on the scale—will be more reliable 
than less advanced technology that relies on human 
occupants.66 It is difficult to incorporate human 
intervention in a near-autonomous vehicle: Adapting 
to and preparing for human attention spans and 
response time presents a set of challenges that these 
firms would rather bypass.67, 68
The difficulty of reaching Level 5 technology could 
mean that fully autonomous vehicles are delayed 
far beyond most optimistic forecasts. The head of 
the Toyota Research Institute, for example, believes 
that the perfection of Level 4 technology could 
take decades, and that Level 5 technology could 
take even longer. This is a much more pessimistic 
prediction.69, 70 Indeed, previous “three to five years” 
predictions, including one from Google in early 2013, 
are starting to prove too optimistic.71 However, it is 
important to note that there are significant incentives 
to bring these innovations to the market as soon 
as possible, and that these might be stronger 
than for other automotive innovations.72, 73 For 
example, eliminating the driver in taxi and trucking 
applications could result in substantial cost savings 
as well as lower insurance premiums for consumers 
and governments, increased efficiencies, and safer 
operation. The wages of truck drivers, for instance, 
were found to be over a third of the total operating 
costs of trucking according to one European 
report.74 It is possible that technology suitable for 
fleet operation might arrive much more quickly 
than similar technology for consumer use. Fleet 
operations are much more predictable and usually 
are confined to certain geographic areas and routes.
Yet counting on these upsides to fuel technological 
breakthroughs is risky; there is no guarantee that 
there are easy solutions to intractable problems, just 
like there is no logical reason why it would be easy to 
advance up the SAE scale just because a taxonomy 
has been created.75, 76 These realities have been left 
out of many of the more optimistic predictions. Less 
charitably, this could be because the more optimistic 
predictions stated earlier—that fully autonomous cars 
would arrive in three to five years—to some degree 
reflect an investment and public relations strategy77 
that firms have employed to get subsidies and other 
preferential treatment,78 and not a sober assessment 
of the obstacles ahead and the challenges in proving 
that fully autonomous vehicles are safe and reliable. 
This would be consistent with other predictions of 
much-hyped products and firms—as well as entire 
industries—at various points in history.79, 80, 81
If the technology is successfully developed, 
the rate of the adoption and popularization of 
autonomous vehicles will depend greatly on whether 
necessary infrastructure is built, and whether and 
how regulation responds to these advances in 
technology.82 One of the inevitable debates will be 
between those who wish to ensure that autonomous 
vehicles are safe and reliable and those who want 
to get them to market as soon as possible.83, 84 The 
outcome of this debate could greatly determine how 
the labor market is affected. Thorough vetting of the 
technology, along with phased rollouts, would allow 
time for workers to adjust to incoming shocks, and 
would dampen those shocks as well.
ON THE IMPACT OF A RAPID TRANSITION 
TO AUTONOMOUS-VEHICLE TECHNOLOGY
At many times in history, various economic thinkers 
have argued that technology will cause a permanent 
decline in jobs, only to be proven wrong.85 
Advancements in computer technology have some 
who are involved in the public debate arguing that, 
this time, the nature of technological change really 
will lead to permanent joblessness.86 The other side 
argues that these people are wrong, and that, as 
in the past, there will be no permanent decline in 
employment, and that employment losses in certain 
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sectors are offset by jobs in other sectors, including 
in new fields created by technological change. They 
also argue that increased automation can lead to 
a shorter workweek and other increased living 
standards if productivity gains are shared in an 
equal way. One of the main pieces of evidence from 
this group is that productivity growth, a proxy for 
automation, has been low for the past decade or so.87
The most recent debate on this topic has had 
automated vehicles at its heart. For instance, the 
Obama administration released a report in late 2016 
echoing an earlier study that claimed that almost half 
of all jobs in the United States could be eliminated 
due to automation in the short- to medium-term, 
a large percentage of which included driving 
occupations.88 Assuming that autonomous vehicles 
meet or exceed expectations for cost savings and 
productivity, there are similar and allied occupations 
to those examined in this paper that could expand as 
a result of the technology and absorb workers who 
lose their jobs in driving occupations. They include 
mechanics; roadside repair technicians; warehouse 
workers to load, off-load, and inspect autonomous 
trucks; rail workers; mariners; and manufacturing 
workers to create specific parts for the vehicles. The 
remaining workers in the trucking industry would 
likely have higher wages, following a similar pattern 
as the decline of longshoremen.89 Other occupations, 
such as software engineering, could expand, both 
from growth in the autonomous-vehicle industry 
and from the economic boost the use of the vehicles 
would generate.
An important way to view automation is how it 
will replace individual activities rather than entire 
occupations; as the individual activities accumulate, 
the occupation will be substantially altered or 
eliminated. If vehicles are introduced but are not 
fully autonomous and are thus limited to certain 
contexts, the impact of autonomous technology 
will be less. For example, if vehicles were able to 
navigate safely only on interstate highways, trucking 
occupations would be affected, but not delivery 
or bus driving occupations. Even in the trucking 
industry, there are many tasks that are difficult to 
imagine autonomous-vehicle technology being 
able to manage, which may limit their adoption or 
consign them or the driver to a secondary role.90 
This includes many things that truck drivers are 
required to know,91 such as how to inspect the 
vehicle and cargo, perform maintenance and fix 
emergency problems, put on tire chains and deal 
with unpredictable weather, refuel the vehicle safely, 
and carry dangerous materials safely, to name a few.
There is also the question of more socially oriented 
driving jobs. Bus drivers are one example. City 
bus drivers preserve order and safety on buses, 
provide information, ensure payment, and are 
generally considered community members and 
authority figures.92 School bus drivers have specific 
responsibilities related to the safety of the children they 
supervise.93 For these reasons, it may not be desirable 
or necessary to replace bus drivers, completely at least, 
even if the buses were fully autonomous. There is also a 
chance that in the far-off future, society (especially cities) 
will rely less on cars and more on walking and public 
transportation (perhaps still operated by bus drivers), 
somewhat reducing the need for autonomous vehicles 
in the first place.94
Lastly, even if fully autonomous vehicles were available 
tomorrow, it does not mean that occupations would 
vanish overnight. The Bureau of Labor Statistics 
predicts there will still be significant employment 
in 2024 even for occupations that were declining 
quickly in 2014, including some that might already be 
considered obsolete.95 To use trucking as an example 
again, there are many owner-operators who have 
driven their tractor-trailers for many years, and they are 
unlikely to stop doing so in the short term.
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CONCLUSION
Kevin, the bus driver quoted at the beginning 
of this paper, explains that his job allows him 
to have a good life with his family. Without his 
employment as a bus driver, he surmises that he 
would need multiple jobs to maintain the same 
standard of living. The median worker in a driving 
occupation earns about $31,000,96 enough to 
keep a family out of federally defined poverty. 
If people like Kevin were to try to replace their 
salary with minimum-wage jobs, they would need 
to work two full-time jobs.
It is difficult—and probably impossible—to 
accurately predict the impact of autonomous 
vehicles on the economy. The number of jobs 
at risk could be greater than four million. The 
jobs supporting the drivers in the transportation 
industry may also be at risk as the number of 
drivers declines. Autonomous vehicles will 
no doubt create occupations that are hard to 
imagine today. Will there be roadside computer 
repair technicians to fix computer malfunctions 
in autonomous vehicles? Autonomous vehicles 
promise to be much safer than vehicles driven by 
people. Will autonomous vehicles lead to indirect 
job creation due to the additional dollars that 
people and businesses have to spend once they 
are saving money on vehicle insurance, accident 
repairs, and car-crash medical bills? These are 
some of the reasons why it is very hard to predict 
how autonomous vehicles will transform our 
economy.
What this paper has done is address some of the 
questions that should inform how we deal with 
disruptions from a shift to autonomous vehicles if 
they occur: What kinds of jobs are these? Who relies 
them and where? And what advantages do they 
offer? It also has evaluated the optimistic predictions 
for the arrival of fully autonomous-vehicle 
technology—the kind that could replace traditional 
driving jobs—as well as the likely extent of the impact 
of that technology.
Regardless of what the future holds, more than 
30 companies say they are just a few years away 
from introducing autonomous vehicles to the mass 
market. While it is unknown what the ultimate impact 
of autonomous vehicles will have on jobs, there is 
a possibility that there could be a relatively rapid 
transition. This is likely to cause significant pain in a 
number of communities, as well as exacerbate the 
losses of “good jobs,” a category that includes some 
driving jobs.97 It would be prudent to strengthen 
our safety net and labor market to absorb a shock 
from autonomous-vehicle technology, as well as 
ensure that autonomous-vehicle technology is safe 
and reliable. This will be a challenge, given the 
recent change in the party controlling the executive 
branch, and its new secretary of transportation.98 
Strengthening the unemployment insurance system, 
improving apprenticeship programs, making higher 
education more affordable, and committing to 
full employment can not only minimize the harm 
to displaced workers, but can provide them with 
opportunities that lead to fulfilling and economically 
sustaining jobs. This is good policy whether or not 
autonomous vehicles are around the corner.
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